The papers in this special issue not only contribute to the classic experimental economics literature on nonmarket techniques and social dilemmas, but also illustrate how far the field has grown since the early 1990s. The papers cover a wide range of topics from emissions auctions under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Shobe et al. 2010) to managing a multispecies fishery (Anderson 2010) , and use a variety of methods including traditional laboratory experiments, field experiments, and hybrid approaches, such as Knapp and Murphy's (2010) field-in-the-lab approach and Bernard and He's (2010) examination of how field prices impact bidding behavior for real items in a lab environment. What is common in these studies is the use of what Shogren, Parkhurst, and Hudson (2010) refer to as an experimental "mindset" which seeks to better understand the behavior of individuals, businesses, and organizations within the context of various institutional settings.
Shogren, invited to return as a keynote speaker for this workshop, noted how experimental methods have expanded from controlled laboratory settings with undergraduate students to include field experiments, neuroeconomics and virtual reality. He discussed how behavioral economics has grown as a field and is now not only challenging parts of the traditional rational choice framework, but is also influencing economic policy makers at the highest levels. In addition to this methodological growth, the application of experimental methods to environmental and natural resource issues also underwent significant expansion in the mid-to late-1990's. Shogren's 1992 talk roughly coincided with two significant events in environmental policy that helped broaden experimental research to include more applied policy issues. The 1989 Exxon Valdez spill substantially expanded the existing literature on nonmarket valuation techniques, particularly regarding hypothetical bias and the development of calibration techniques to mitigate its effects. A key component of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments was the implementation of the US Environmental Protection Agency's sulfur dioxide emissions trading program, one of the world's first successful large-scale cap-and-trade programs, leading to a surge in experimental research related to the design of emissions trading programs and more broadly, on laboratory "testbedding" of new environmental policy initiatives. Testbedding of policies using experimental economics has been compared to using wind tunnels to test airplane design (Shogren 2004 ).
The workshop's other keynote speaker, Cason (2010) , highlighted the growth in the use of experiments as testbeds for policy. Economics experiments are now providing valuable input into a wide variety of environmental, natural resource, and agricultural policy questions. Cason has been a major contributor to the emissions trading experimental literature, and his paper in this issue provides an excellent overview. Emission trading institutions, in particular, have received renewed research focus as a result of interest in the development of markets for a variety of environmental services, such as greenhouse gas emissions. Both Cason's and Shogren's talks touched upon a theme that frequently emerged throughout the workshop and is still a hot topic of discussion within the field of experimental economics: the relative merits of laboratory and field experiments. Around the late 1990's the landscape of experimental economics underwent a significant expansion with respect to both the range to topics studied and the experimental methods used. Until this time, the overwhelming majority of experiments were conducted in laboratory settings with university students in the United States and Europe. There was a natural progression with a significant surge in field studies using non-student subject pools.
1 Joe Henrich (2000) was conducting field experiments with indigenous communities in Peru that laid the foundation for the 15 societies study which integrated ethnographic and experimental research in a cross-cultural comparison (Henrich et al. 2004 ). John List was concurrently working with sportscard dealers and found that experience matters in market exchange environments (List 2000 (List , 2001 (List , and 2003 .
The participants in Juan Camilo Cardenas' field experiments were rural villagers in Colombia whose livelihood depended upon successful management of a common pool resource.
At the time, most experiments used neutral, context-free language to provide more experiment control. As Cason notes in this issue, the rationale for neutral framing was to reduce the likelihood that providing a context might unintentionally invoke certain preferences that the experimenter cannot observe. However, Cardenas was concerned that, in the absence of a context, subjects would introduce their own unobservable context leading to less control. He argued that these villagers might bring a set of experiences and information about the context in a social dilemma that was quite different from that of university students (e.g., Cardenas, Stanlund, and Willis 2000, Cardenas and Ostrom 2004) .
This special issue features two field experiments conducted in developing nations. Alevy, Cristi, and Melo (2010) worked with Chilean farmers to test the properties of a right-to-choose auction. Prior to the experiment, the research team acquired actual water volumes that were then offered for sale to farmers in two different auctions. Similar to Cardenas' experiments, the commodity being auctioned (water) is essential for the subjects' livelihoods and the experiments were framed using a context that was already familiar to the subjects. Their results suggest that the right-to-choose auction raises more revenue than a sequential auction and that varying risk attitudes can explain much of the difference in bidding behaviors observed in the two auctions.
The paper by Lybbert et al. (2010) has a development focus. The authors note that their framed field experiments in Morocco, Peru and Kenya offer benefits not only to researchers seeking to understand how the poor respond to risk and to complex products, such as index insurance, but also the experiments provide an educational benefit by helping low-income farmers understand complex stochastic, dynamic processes.
Cason's (2010) paper discusses the merits of lab experiments, including the testbedding of proposed new rules and institutions, which is a focus of several papers in this special issue.
For instance, Anderson (2010) tests a points-based system for managing the Northeast Multispecies Fishery that was proposed by an industry group. The experimental results show that harvesters are broadly responsive to this system of point prices, especially those with experience. Anderson concludes by suggesting that this type of system could be used to effectively manage a multispecies fishery to ensure acceptable economic and biological outcomes, assuming that the point prices can be readily adjusted over time. Doyon, Rondeau, and Mbala (2010) test new auction mechanisms for tradable egg production quotas in Quebec.
They show that in thin markets, such as those common in highly concentrated agricultural industries, that the Truncated k-Double Auction can help decrease equilibrium prices with only moderate efficiency losses, thereby helping counter potential market power from oligopolies. Shobe et al. (2010) focus their use of experimental auctions to examine issues related to the direct sale of carbon emissions in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Their paper tests the effects of "loose" and "strict" caps on the allocated allowances based on recent emission history.
Their results suggest that auction revenue is lower compared to competitive benchmarks when a loose cap is used, but that these differences in revenue dissipate after a series of auctions. the Bristol Bay Alaska salmon fishery. They use a novel, interactive experiment that "brings the field into the lab." The task for subjects in their lab experiment was comparable to the field task under investigation-actively harvesting from a limited resource stock. Subjects had to decide which harvesting device (measuring cups) to purchase, each of which had different harvesting capacities (cup size) and acquisition costs. The harvesting devices were then used to extract valuable items (dry beans) from a common pool resource (a large bowl). Bernard and He (2010) examine how bidding behavior in lab experiments involving the purchase of food might be influenced by field prices before and after a large increase in the prices for these goods in the field. Their results support the growing literature that suggests that researchers should be conscious of how field prices affect willingness-to-pay bids in experiments.
Other studies in this issue have policy implications, but the motivation is more general. In summary, this special issue illustrates the breadth of current application of experimental economics techniques to issues of importance to environmental, resource, and agricultural economics. As Shogren departed from the two-day workshop, he reported what a pleasure it was to see how the "seeds" that the early pioneers of experimental economics help plant have now "blossomed."
